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 Newly independent nation-states grapple with governance, in the midst of globalization and 
“democratic waves.” The post-colonial political mavericks can manipulate the institutions in the 
fragile states to the extent that the choices may be antithetical to democratic consolidation. Thus, 
institutional choices will be one of the factors which will determine democratic maturation. This paper 
seeks to examine any patterns of institutional choices or generalities by political elites in Africa and the 
Middle East, coupled with the realities of globalization. Secondly, this paper will illustrate which 
institutional choices in general are perhaps more feasible for democratic consolidation in fragile states.  
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Since the end of the Cold War, the push for democratization and globalization have been 
touted as the two-pronged “savior” of fledgling governments throughout the “Third World” 
or “developing” world or emerging markets (Agtmael 2007) might suggest. However, the 
majority of studies on democratization and globalization often ignore, or at best give scant 
attention to Africa and the Middle East. Democracy coupled with economic liberalization in 
the name of globalization has been viewed as the panacea for the world’s struggling and 
nascent countries. These nascent states, many of which are newly independent countries 
(NICs) as well, are “playing” catch up in many instances with the dominant well-established 
Western countries. Coupled with the realities of abject poverty, ethnic and religious prone-
politics and class, a cleavage in many of these (NICs) is the experimentation of state-centric 
versus anti-state-centric institutional policies. Basically, state-centric institutional polices 
advance the idea that governmental intervention (or regulatory measures) in the political and 
economic realms will help lessen the chances for turmoil. Whereas, anti-state-centric policies 
advocate minimal governmental intervention; the notion of the “invisible hand” of the 
market should suffice any major political and economic deprivation. 
Contrary to the “end of history” (Fukuyama 1992) thesis, Western forms of democracy are 
not necessarily appropriate for these politically fragile and economically weak states for a 
variety of reasons (which will be highlighted later in this article). A politically fragile state is 
a situation in which state authority has not been effectively established or consolidated 
(Marshall and Jaggers 2002). Moreover, the state institutions are weak, and the state has very 
little direct control over either the citizens or resources under its authority. A quintessential 
example of a politically fragile state currently would be Iraq. By economically weak, I refer 
to David Simon’s (2003: 140) definition, nation-states that are “dependent on a narrow range 
of exports, especially of raw and semi-processed commodities and perhaps one or two 
groups of manufactures, are more vulnerable and have already seen domestic industry 
undermined by cheaper imports.” For example, during the decade of the 1990s, the average 




level of subsidies and other transfers of income as a percentage of expenditures in lower 
middle income countries were only 18% in 1990 and 26% in 1997 (compared to highly 
industrialized countries where the average level of subsidies and other income transfers was 
approximately 60%) (worldbank.org), an example of an economically weak state would be 
current day Ethiopia. 
Thus, this paper seeks to investigate the general patterns and implications of institutional 
choices on democracy in Africa and the Middle East in the face of the growing demands of 
economic glasnost and perestroika, i.e., globalization. A caveat, the generic geographical, 
political term “Middle East” is a colonial and Western imperial, Eurocentric construct, a 
byproduct of an unfavorable and inferior other, like the Orient connotation of Asia (Said 
1978). Although countries in the Middle East have no common cultural, linguistic, religious, 
or socio-political identities (Alkadry 2002) they do however, exhibit general patterns of 
institutional choices by their political leaders just like in Africa. Thus, for the purposes of 
this paper, to minimize confusion and debate, the Middle East will be used to convey the 
general geographical areas between the Mediterranean Sea, and the geographical areas west 
of Asia, and including the Gulf States and the countries of North Africa (Egypt, Algeria, 
Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco). Additionally, the only two ethnic groups in the above areas 
which do not currently have a nation-state (homeland)- the Palestinians and Kurds- are also 
included in the Middle East.   
The organization of this paper is as follows. First (after the introduction), I will briefly 
discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the literature on democracy generally and as it 
applies to Africa and the Middle East; secondly, I will address my theoretical framework, 
institutionalism; thirdly, I will examine some baseline data and discuss the findings; lastly, I 
will discuss the conclusions and implications for future research in the area of institutional 
choice, globalization, and democracy in Africa and the Middle East. 
 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The end of the anxious Cold War between the United States and the former Soviet Union 
and the satellite countries (“puppet” regimes) in Africa and the Middle East, has ushered in 
vociferous calls for globalization and democratization (Grugel 2002). Even though in the last 
fifty plus years of Middle East independence, not a single country in the Middle East has 
achieved full-fledged democracy (Alkadry 2002) at least not according to Western, liberal 
standards of democracy (with perhaps Turkey being the exception). However, diverse 
Middle Eastern and African countries such as Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon, Iran, Morocco, Sudan, 
have made considerable strides toward constructing democratic institutions (Alkadry 2002). 
But, most Middle Eastern countries have only attained the level of procedural democracy 
(Ali 2002). There are elections for legislative and executive seats in Algeria, Lebanon, Iran, 
Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Turkey, and Yemen (The Middle East and North Africa 
2001). On the other hand, in Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia, there are 
elections for legislative seats. However, currently none of the oil-rich Gulf States (the oil 
monarchies), with the exception of Kuwait, have electoral participation- they include Saudi 
Arabia (coincidently a United States ally), Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and 
Oman (The Middle East and North Africa 2001). But, generally the democratization 
literature has struggled to explain political change such as liberalization in the Middle East 
and Africa, especially North Africa (Anderson 1995). 
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Unfortunately, much of the democratization literature focuses on “substantive policy 
content” (Powell 2004: 13) which limits our ability to analyze and compare across countries. 
Instead, Powell suggests that students of democratization should focus on the processes of 
democratic linkages, like structuring choices (first linkage), institutional aggregation (linkage 
two), and policymaking (final linkage). Regrettably, Western paradigms of democracy, 
suggest that any discussion outside of particular endogenous variables, are presumed to 
stymie political liberalization efforts. Additionally, liberalization efforts do not always open 
up the political process or help democratize. At times, liberalization efforts such as the 
essential tool, elections, have helped sustain authoritarian governments in sub-Saharan 
Africa by furnishing a tactical maneuver that kept the competitors at bay without acquiescing 
in the government’s authority (Joseph 1997). Moreover, Western, liberal democracies that 
tout “winner-take-all” or zero-sum games in majoritarian systems perhaps are not appropriate 
in highly stratified societies like in Africa and the Middle East. Grand coalitions which 
typically appease majority and minority groups are perhaps more advantageous for Africa 
and the Middle East. Furthermore, in majoritarian systems, the majority party governs with 
fewer constraints, not only regarding political choices but also fiscal policy choices (Persson 
and Tabellini 2003). This reality has colossal implications in the face of globalization’s 
“push and pulls” factors. “Push and pull” factors include notions of free trade and structural 
adjustment programs (SAPs) in order to compete in the global marketplace. Moreover, 
Dillman (2002) has demonstrated that in the case of North Africa, significant globalization 
measures in the form of economic trade and liberalization policies have had very little impact 
on political liberalization. Dillman (2002) attributes this shortcoming to political elites’ 
institutional choices which stipulate partial economic reforms that only sustain distributional 
coalitions, and which limit far-reaching political reforms to the masses. In other words, the 
autonomous preferences and interests of political elites override the public good of increased 
political liberties and civil rights for the community.   
Likewise in most of the democratization literature, “suspects” such as primordial political 
culture, religion, ethnicity and class cleavages, low levels of economic development, low 
levels of education, and fragile or nonexistent civil society activities are considered 
quintessentially destructive forces to any democratic model. There is clearly a relationship 
between highly fractionalized (ethnic, class and religious cleavages) countries and the 
tendency to be associated with lower levels of constraints on their chief political executive 
(e.g., president, prime minister) (Aghion, et al. 2004). Thus, lower levels of executive 
constraints open the door to corruption and autocratic rule, which clearly are antithetical to 
democracy-building. Furthermore, ethnically fragmented societies’ political systems are less 
democratic (Aghion, et al. 2004). In such ethnically diverse societies, executives choose 
political systems and make institutional choices which shield or insulate certain groups and 
prevent others (out-groups) from having input.  
In addition, there is other evidence illustrating that religious and ethnic cleavages have 
compromised democratic consolidation (Yegen 1999; Lewin and Stier 2002), not only in the 
Middle East, but throughout Africa as well. Notwithstanding, the “third wave” (Huntington 
1991) of democracy appears to be gaining if not hurricane strength, at least “tropical 
depression” fortitude in previously unthinkable places throughout Africa and the Middle East. 
African countries such as Botswana (the longest standing democracy in post-colonial Africa), 
Mauritius, Mauritania, South Africa, Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, Zimbabwe, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, and others have made the arduous trek to democracy and have 
consolidated democracy at various levels. Currently, 35% of Africa can be characterized as 




democratic, i.e., nineteen of the fifty-four countries have democratic rule. This ratio should 
not be considered shabby by pessimists, given the reality that most of Africa, especially sub-
Saharan Africa has only been “free” from colonial rule less than fifty years. Never mind the 
reality that democracy waxes and wanes and “one size does not fit all.” Rustow’s (1970: 
346) parsimonious recommendation is quite appropriate even in this post-Cold War era, 
“there may be many roads to democracy.” Or put another way, “... the same formal rules 
and/or constitutions imposed on different societies produce different outcomes” (North 1990: 
4). The next section of this paper discusses the theoretical framework, i.e., institutionalism.  
       
 
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: INSTITUTIONALISM 
 
First, what are institutions? In the case of political institutions, they are public entities 
“with formally designated structures and functions, intended to regulate certain defined 
activities which apply to the whole population” (Bealey 1999: 166). Furthermore, 
“institutions define and limit the set of choices of individuals” (North 1990: 4). Institutions 
help constrain those innate human impulses. That is, institutions help shape and constrain 
political and economic policies. Institutions were especially important in the immediate post-
colonial period, because of the trepidation of the residuals of colonialization, the “jockeying” 
for power by the elites and mobilization of competing interests. Institutionalism includes 
parliamentary and presidential-style democracy, social democracy and Islamism. For 
example, Libya’s hybrid model of governance by the populace via local Shari’a (Islamic 
law) councils. Moreover, Libya’s legal system resembles an amalgamation of Italian and 
French civil law, coupled with Shari’a. Political elite behavior (and all political behavior for 
that matter), including corrupt behavior (manipulating public power for one’s private gain) is 
by and large influenced by the way political power is organized. The key to constraining 
corruption is to provide some level of checks and balances on the passions of human nature. 
Institutionalism focuses on regulating the political behavior of the political leaders. Thus, 
institutionalism is the theory that posits formal political organizations like legislatures, 
executive branches, courts, and local governing councils as necessary to ameliorate political 
behavior that attempts to engage in malfeasance. Linked with constraining behavior and 
advocating accountability is non-state actors such as Non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs).  
Non-governmental organizations as institutions may facilitate democratic rule, but are not 
sufficient to create democratic consolidation. NGOs are endogenous “tools” that compete 
with exogenous “push and pull” factors such as globalization. Political elites in Africa and 
the Middle East in their attempts to wean themselves from the residuals of colonialism, 
including autocratic and military rule, should consider the types of institutional choices that 
are appropriate for their particular country. Political elite choices include constraining 
executive power in the form of legislative checks and balances; expanding executive 
recruitment efforts that go beyond nepotism; expanding the range of participants in the 
political process (e.g., not just males over the age of eighteen, or royal blood lines); and 
increasing the competitiveness of participation, all of which can be mandated and monitored 
via a written constitution.  
Institutions are tools to help sustain democracy. Moreover, “institutions structure behavior 
into stable, predictable, and recurrent patterns,” thus “institutional systems are less volatile 
and more enduring, and so are institutionalized democracies” (Diamond, et al. 1995: 33). 
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This notion of institutions is a type of theory of organizational institutionalism. It suggests 
that there are necessary organizations such as legislatures, executives and courts that can 
facilitate democratic transitions and ultimately the institutionalization of democracy, that is, 
democratic consolidation. However, we still should heed Rustow’s (1970) “pre-third wave” 
finding, in which he illustrated that transitions to democracy are dynamic and thus varied. 
Rustow warned us that “no two existing democracies have gone through a struggle between 
the very same forces over the same issues and with the same institutional outcome. Hence, it 
seems unlikely that any future democracy will follow in the precise footsteps of any of its 
predecessors” (354).  
Colonial polices in terms of economic growth and democratic consolidation did not vary 
much in either Africa or the Middle East. And maintenance of hand-picked political elites as 
pawns of the Western colonializers helped perpetuate policy-implementing institutions (an 
executive branch), as opposed to policymaking institutions (legislatures). In other words, 
African and Middle Eastern colonial and post-colonial leaders were “forced” to be 
administrators of Western-propagated policies as “tools” of Western imperialism, as opposed 
to creating viable participatory, representative legislatures. Legislatures would be more 
beholden to their constituents, which would allow for some democratic maturation. As Riggs 
(1963) and LaPalombara (1974) illustrated years ago (the residuals of which are still quite 
conspicuous), the lack of effective legislatures, cumbersome bureaucracies, and entrenched 
military rule is still commonplace throughout much of Africa and the Middle East. Likewise, 
the nineteenth century European colonializers carved up Africa and the Middle East, 
establishing non-democratic and traditionally alien governments in the nascent states. Thus, 
general patterns of institutional choice by post-colonial leaders tended to reflect their 
colonial legacies of either liberal or statist political and economic policies. In the twenty-first 
century, Taylor and Nel (2002), caution the “New Africa” Initiative (comprising the political 
leaders from Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Mali, and Tanzania) to be 
vigilant in the neo-liberal discourse of globalization because it may perpetuate the benefits to 
only a small number of elites like themselves. Perhaps we might call it the Dhlomo effect. Dr. 
Oscar Dhlomo is a good example of the type of elite who would benefit most from this type 
of neo-liberal engagement (Moore 2001). 
During the United States (US) Presidential administrations of Ronald Reagan (1981-89) 
and George Bush, Sr. (1989-92), US investment in the South African economy had a 
political and economic phase, i.e., funding for private sector investment initiatives and 
appeasing the Inkatha Freedom Party’s objectives of dismantling apartheid. Oscar Dhlomo 
benefited when he left his minister post of the “KwaZulu ‘homeland’ Department of 
Education to facilitate meetings among the leaders of the contesting parties in order to reduce 
the violence and to work toward a smoothly functioning democratic system” (Moore 2001: 
922). Political violence is often part of the transition phase of democracy, and only one 
indicator of the transition. Moore goes on to say “He (Dhlomo) sold the idea of an 
organization to perform such a function to Hank Cohen, the Assistant Secretary for African 
Affairs in the State Department at that time.” Moreover, “Cohen gave him a letter that 
guaranteed him funding of five million rand a year to take to the USAID office in Pretoria” 
(South Africa). “Thus was born the Institute for the Multi-Party Democracy (IMPD) and the 
renewed career of a man who would play a key role, as member of the Independent Electoral 
Commission ....” Moore concludes, “That Dhlomo now directs Durban’s (South Africa) first 
casino may bolster arguments that this sort of aid promotes a new bourgeoisie and a politics 
to match it ...” (922). 




Therefore, the types of general patterns of institutional choices that the political elites of 
Africa and the Middle East are subscribing to, include the following: capitulating (or co-
opted) to the whims of the Western powers for short-term economic gain (a type of economic 
“end of history” ideology); willingness to use coercion (and repression) as a tool to control 
and manipulate; political elites’ maintenance of coalitions that may not have an interest in 
democratization (but support economic liberalization because of self-interest); political 
elites’ maintenance of dependent distributional coalitions (which can partake in economic 
windfalls as long as they are politically loyal); and partial reform policies to appease 
international financial donors such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. 
However, despite these worthy economic liberalization reforms to accommodate the ever-
growing demands of globalization, why have North Africa and a majority of the Middle East 
experienced very little political liberalization vis-à-vis poorer sub-Saharan countries with 
increasing political liberalization? To answer that question, we must investigate more closely 




Globalization, is also known as free trade with minimal barriers to access markets, liberal 
trade policies, international movement of transnational capital, goods, and labor, the 
hegemony of neo-liberal economic policies, and minimal state involvement in the exchange 
of those goods and services, that is, laissez-faire capitalism. Castells (1997) warns us that 
globalization undermines state-power (especially in “developing” countries), and any 
attempts at reconstructing national identities are also sabotaged by the forces of globalization. 
In short, globalization is the new form of imperialism. Globalization in many ways reduces 
the economic and political sovereignty of nation-states. Globalization does this by being 
hostile to protective markets, tariff measures, protective legislation, executive mandates, and 
so on. Globalization means that you must “play” by the rules regardless of your economic 
position vis-à-vis other countries’ competitive edge. The barriers to free trade are viewed 
with disdain and are a bane to economic development. Globalization means that political 
elites’ institutional choices have to be tailored in such a way that the political systems tend to 
become heavily bureaucratized in order to meet the economic requirements to “play” in the 
global marketplace of goods and services. Furthermore, political elites’ institutional choices 
are focused on the management and execution of national polices which must coincide with 
International Financial Institution (IFI) demands, like the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, coupled with Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Globalization tends to focus 
more on political stability (Alkadry 2002) (rather than democratization), which can mean 
authoritarianism at worst, or pseudo-democracy, illiberal democracy (Alianak 2004) at best. 
Globalization, coupled with the seemingly never-ending political and military instability in 
many parts of Africa and the Middle East, means that political elites’ institutional choices 
will have to attempt to abate such realities. A caveat, Lupo (2004) warns us, political 
violence may temporarily inhibit democracy (like other potential characteristics such as elite 
noncompliance and elite reception of radicals). Likewise, military expenditures continue to 
drain Middle Eastern budgets. In fact, on average, Middle Eastern countries devote a greater 
proportion of their gross domestic product to military purchases than any other region in the 
world (Henry 2003). The following are typical theoretical models of globalization 
manifested in the industrialized West and the “developing” world. These basic models 
provide a framework for my data, findings and discussion. 
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Western Model of Globalization 
(liberalization policies; increased free trade; 
FDI) 
“Developing” State Model of Globalization 
(structural adjustment programs; defensive 
modernization to protect certain precious 
commodities) 
Free-Market & Keynesian Institutional Policy 
Choices 
Interventionist Institutional Policy Choices by 
Political Elites (includes social & economic 
justice outcomes and policies to mitigate ethnic 
& religious-prone politics); Islamism 
Fosters Democratic Consolidation (Maturation) 
via political & economic liberties                
Acts as a liaison to either augment or mitigate 
democratic maturation 
                                                                                                
 
 
4. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The primary goal of this paper was to identify information in regard to institutional 
choices that political elites in general in Africa and the Middle East perhaps should consider 
which will perchance generate democratic maturation. Democratic maturation should be 
based on a country’s particular cultural, social and historical nuances, not a “cookie-cutter,” 
normative notion of democracy. A caveat, although Islamism is an institutional choice, such 
as in the case of Libya’s hybrid model of local populace governance through Shari’a (Islamic 
law) councils, this study focused more on non-Islamist countries. Furthermore, the salience 
of Islamism as an institutional choice is becoming more apparent in transitory Iraq, and has 
been entrenched in Iran since the revolution in 1979. Moreover, obtaining data on Islamist 
states, was difficult at best for a variety of reasons, thus this paper does not address Islamism 
as an institutional choice to the degree that it focused on non-Islamism institutional choices. 
Institutional choices might mean deregulating participation, i.e., increasing who can 
participate in the political process, the pluralist notion. Institutional choice may also mean 
maximizing executive restraints so as to minimize the chances for autocratic rule and 
corruption, which will increase the chance for the consolidation or maturation of democracy. 
After all, corrupt behavior in public office is based on a monopoly of power coupled with 
indiscretion, where there is no accountability, nor transparency.  That is, which institutional 
choices are necessary (although not sufficient) to ensure democratic maturation? Moreover, 
what are the institutional choices that political elites in Africa and the Middle East should 




H1: African and Middle Eastern country political elites that are making the transition to 
democracy, while deciding institutional choices, are more likely to institutionalize or 
consolidate democracy if there is less regulation of who can participate in the political 
process. Less regulation in the participatory process should lead to more competition, more 
viable choices for voters, thus more competitive politics. 
H2: Political elites in African and Middle Eastern countries that are making the transition 
to democracy are more likely to institutionalize democracy if there are more constraints on 




executives. More constraints on the executives will help minimize the chances for corruption, 
and autocratic rule (especially in nascent democratic systems). More executive constraint 
should lead to more competition and recruitment of viable executives in the political process, 
thereby facilitating democratic consolidation. 




In order to test the significance and provide preliminary evidence of the relevance of 
institutional choice and the related hypotheses, some partial regression plots and correlations 
were employed to quantitatively investigate the years 1960-2000. The forty years will allow 
trends regarding institutional choices to be analyzed over time. 
 
5.1. Case Selection 
 
The Polity IV data set by Marshall and Jaggers (2002) was used and included most (50 out 
of 54) African countries and all 14 Middle Eastern countries. There are 436 cases in the 
sample, over a forty-year period (1960-2000). 
 
5.2. Dependent Variable 
 
The dependent variable is the institutionalized democracy score, i.e., the level of 
democratic consolidation or maturation. The democracy score based on the Marshall & 
Jaggers (2002) scale, indicates the general openness of political institutions. The eleven point 
democracy scale is constructed additively, based on the autocracy score (general closed 
nature of political institutions) and the polity score (computed by subtracting the autocracy 
score from the democracy score). Autocracies tend to be more insulated, that is, as the 
insulation of the autocrat or chief executive increases, so too does the autocracy score. 
 
5.3. Independent Variables 
 
In order to evaluate the level of democratization, the Polity IV data set was used. Marshall 
and Jaggers (2002) combined annual measures of the regulation and competitiveness of 
participation, the constraints on executives, competitiveness of executive recruitment, and 
the polity score to create an eleven-point scale. The eleven point scale was used to depict the 
country’s democratic and autocratic characteristics. The regulations of executive recruitment 
are the institutionalized procedures regarding the transfer of executive power. That is, the 
openness of the executive recruitment determines the extent to which any eligible (e.g., 
minimum age and citizenship requirements) citizen has an opportunity (at least in principle), 
to attain the position of executive through a periodic process. The competitiveness of the 
executive recruitment is the extent to which executives are chosen through competitive 
elections. The openness of executive recruitment is the opportunity for non-elites to attain 
executive office. The executive constraint variable is the operational (de facto) independence 
of the chief executive (e.g., president, prime minister, premier). The regulation of 
participation indicates the level of development of the institutional structures for political 
expression by the populace. 
Lastly, the competitiveness of participation variable indicates the extent to which non-
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elites are able to access institutional structures for political expression (e.g., free speech, 
freedom to assemble, protest). The democratic and autocratic characteristics were then 
combined to produce a third indicator- the polity (country) score, which is derived by 
subtracting the autocratic score from the democratic score. Thus, this score produces a single 
regime score which ranges from a +10 (fully democratic characteristics) to a -10 (fully 
autocratic characteristics). This polity score indicator was used to operationalize the 
institutionalization or consolidation of democracy, i.e., level of democratization. 
                      
5.4. Findings 
 
1) Regression Plots about Here 
In order to provide preliminary statistical significance to institutional choice and related 
hypotheses, regression analysis and correlations were conducted. There were statistical 
significance and strong associations between the institutional choices with the following 
independent variables: competitiveness of participation, regulation of participation, executive 
constraints, competitiveness of executive recruitment, and the polity score vis-à-vis the 
dependent variable of institutionalized democracy. For example, the partial regression plot of 
the competitiveness of participation clearly indicated that institutional choices by political 
elites that engender more participation in the political process will increase the chances for 
democratic consolidation. Institutional choices such as opening up the process of whom 
actually can participate, less rigid voting requirements, no nepotism or inner circle 
requirements, and no socioeconomic status requirements should all help augment the chances 
for institutionalizing democracy in Africa and the Middle East, and more generally in 
nascent democracies. 
Conversely, the partial regression plot of the regulation of participation and 
institutionalizing democracy illustrated that the more restraints on who can participate and 
how they can participate, the lesser the chances for democratic consolidation. Thus, political 
elites in Africa and the Middle East should seriously consider institutional choices which 
generate more participation, that is, fewer regulatory measures of participation. In terms of 
executive constraints, there is clear evidence that increasing political executive restraints so 
as to mitigate autocratic tendencies and dictatorial rule enhances the chances for 
institutionalizing democracy. Allowing political executives some latitude to rule is obviously 
a necessary condition (although not sufficient) for a functioning viable democracy. However, 
too much executive power is antithetical to democratic rule, like too much legislative and 
judicial power. There has to be a compromise or balance of power between the agents or 
branches of government for democracy to not only prevail but become entrenched. Likewise, 
there has to be a competitive environment for political executive recruitment so that there is a 
diversity of challengers in the political process each vying for a role in the democratic 
process. Thus, there is strong evidence as indicated in the partial regression plot that 
illustrates as the competitiveness of executive recruitment increases, so too does the 
institutionalization of democracy. 
Lastly, in terms of the partial regression plot of the polity score and institutionalization of 
democracy, the plot illustrates as the polity score increases, so too does democratic 
consolidation. The polity score is derived by subtracting the autocratic score from the 
democratic score. Thus, this score produces a single regime score which ranges from a +10 
(fully democratic characteristics) to a -10 (fully autocratic characteristics). That is, the higher 
the polity scores, the higher the institutionalization of democracy in a country. 





2) Correlations about Here 
The correlations of the above variables in this study were statistically significant, the 
strength of the association between the independent variables and dependent variable 
(institutionalized democracy) was robust and the direction was positive. All correlations are 
statistically significant, the majority at the .01 level, and only one (regulation of participation 
and competitiveness of participation at the .05 level). The most statistically significant 
correlation at the .01 level in regard to the dependent variable (institutionalized democracy) 
is the association with executive constraints (.871**). This illustrates once again (as 
evidenced by the partial regression plots), that constraining political executives’ ability to 
have a carte blanche in their powers is a necessary condition for a viable, consolidated 





This paper provides baseline research in the area of political elites and institutional choices 
in Africa and the Middle East. Moreover, the research provides at least a starting point inside 
as well as outside of Africa and the Middle East when assessing the variables that impact 
democratization. Feasible institutional choices attempt to complement the usual suspects of 
democratic consolidation, e.g., “adequate” levels of wealth, and high educational levels.  
Additionally, this paper has illustrated that political elites in Africa and the Middle East 
can help foster democracy by facilitating electoral rules that will augment participation. 
Increasing levels of participation regardless of ethnicity, class, religion, and socioeconomic 
status should be paramount in any discussion on democratic consolidation. Moreover, 
mitigating ethnic, class, religious, and socioeconomic cleavages with institutional choices 
involving proportionality, as opposed to majoritarian rules might help appease majority as 
well as minority groups. Institutional choices by political elites in Africa and the Middle East 
in the midst of “push and pull” factors of globalization such as free trade and structural 
adjustment programs in order to compete, might include more coalition building, instead of 
the more contentious Western, majoritarian “winner-take-all” system. A zero-sum political 
system whereby political elites and other vested parties either win or lose leaves no room for 
alleviating conducive dialogue between already historically contentious groups, especially in 
nascent democracies. 
This paper has provided baseline data on the salience of increasing participation, 
constraining executives and creating institutional rules that facilitate notions of democracy, 
in the thick of the stresses of globalization. Future research in the area of political elite 
institutional choices in Africa and the Middle East should consider linking civil society 
actors with the elites to develop better partnerships which enhance democratic maturation, 
and sustainable social, political and economic development. Moreover, future research in the 
area of Islamism as an institutional choice by political elites should be considered. 
Additionally, future research should consider if parliamentary (e.g. England and Thailand), 
presidential (e.g., the United States and the Philippines), or semi-presidential (e.g., France 
and South Korea) systems are genuinely achievable in post-colonial Africa and the Middle 
East. Further, what political and economic costs are involved in the era of increased 
globalization, not only for political elites in Africa and the Middle East, but for the general 
populations? Lastly, democratization studies must seriously consider nonlinear (e.g., social 
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